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MAHARAL'S CONCEPTION OF
THE HUMAN BEING]
Joshua L. Golding

This paper discusses Maharal's conception of the human being and its four
major aspects, namely body, soul, intellect, and tselem (image or form). I
suggest that some of his apparently inconsistent remarks concerning the
human body may be reconciled by distinguishing two different senses of
badness or evil. Secondly, I show that Maharal embraces what might be
termed "moderate rationalism." Thirdly, I elucidate his conception of the
tselem by discussing parallel ideas in Kabbalistic literature.

1.

The writings of Rabbi Judah Loew of Prague (c.1520-c.1609), often
referred to as "Maharal" (a Hebrew acronym for "our master, the Rabbi
Loew") represent a unique and creative blend of doctrines and ideas
drawn from Hebrew Scripture, Talmud, and Midrash; from the Jewish
philosophical tradition, typified by the work of Moses Maimonides;
from Jewish reactions against Maimonides' philosophy such as that of
Hasdai Crescas; and from Kabbalistic literature, especially the Bahir, the
Zohar, and the work of R. Meir Ibn Gabbai (1480-c.1545). Maharal has
been acknowledged as influential on later trends such as Hassidism and
the thought of Rabbi Abraham I. Kook, the twentieth century spiritual
and intellectual leader of Religious Zionism. In the history of Jewish
thought, Maharal is an interesting and important figure, despite the fact
that not much (especially in English) has been written on his work. 2
One of the central topics in Maharal's writings is his conception of the
human being. In this paper I shall sketch the basic outlines of Maharal's
conception of the human being. This paper is by no means an attempt at
a definitive description, which would require the length of a book. My
focus will be on certain aspects of his account which I think are philosophically intriguing, and which bear on his conception of what is the
best relationship with God for the human being. To bring out some of its
unique features, I shall compare and contrast some aspects of his
account with that of Moses Maimonides on the one hand, and
Kabbalistic literature on the other. In the process of elucidating
Maharal's view, I aim to correct what I think is a serious flaw in some
recent discussions of Maharal's attitude toward one aspect of the human
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being, namely, reason or rationality. I shall try to show that while some
scholars have painted Maharal as something of an anti-rationalist, in fact
he embraced what might be termed moderate rationalism.
Any account of the human being from a Jewish perspective must be
judged on the basis of how well the account fits with traditional Jewish
texts, and how well it fits with lived human reflection and experience. In
this paper, I shall not aim to argue that Maharal's account of the human
being is adequate in these respects. Rather, I shall aim for the more modest goal of sympathetically describing Maharal's account and emphasizing some of its unique features. A full scale evaluation of his view must
be left for another occasion.
II.

Let us turn then to Maharal's conception of the human being. In many
places in his writings/ Maharal claims the human being is made up of
three parts, namely, the body (guj), the soul (nefesh), and the intellect
(sekhe/). However, in at least one passage,' Maharal claims there is a
fourth aspect as well, namely, the image or form (fselem), which, as we
shall see, is not reducible to any of the other three parts, and which, in
some sense, transcends them. I shall consider, in turn, the body, soul, and
intellect; and then turn to Maharal's conception of the image or form.
First, the body. The body is the material part of the human being. 5 Like
any matter, the human body takes up a certain amount of physical space;
it comes to be and passes away. In general, matter may be ranked according to its degree of grossness or refinement; for example, the matter of the
celestial spheres is purer than the matter on the earth. Light, especially
from the heavenly bodies, is the purest kind of matter on earth, and it is,
qua matter, superior to other material things. 6 Some human beings have a
more refined body than others; for example, Israelites generally have a
more refined body than gentiles; Moses had a more refined body than
other Israelites. 7 Human beings have the ability to purify or refine the
body through proper behavior. Indeed, Maharal claims the function of
many divine commandments is to refine or purify the body. 8 While
Maharal accepts the doctrine of bodily resurrection, he apparently thinks
that one's physical body does not remain in the world to come, since, he
claims, that world is completely separate from matter. 9
What does it mean to say that material bodies can be more or less
gross or refined? Maharal appears to intend this literally: light from the
heavens is actually less dense than that of the earth; Moses's body was
actually less dense than the typical human body. Why should difference
in density constitute a significant difference in value? The more dense a
body is, the more it is subject to the finite limits and constrictions of
space; the more something is bound by finitude, the more remote it is
from God, the infinite, absolute simplicity. Light is therefore a symbol of
God's revelation and presence. Of course, such ideas are not original in
Maharal; they may be found in many earlier writers as well.lO
What is Maharal's attitude toward the status or value of the body? Is
the body basically good, bad, or neutral? In one place, Maharal has
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some apparently rather negative things to say about the body:
" ... the good [human] qualities are called matters of affliction, since
they afflict man so that he will not follow the desire of his body, and
they are called "the way of life" ... for anything which afflicts and
diminishes his body will cause him to reach the "life"; for death and
negation cleave to the body."11
An even harsher statement occurs in his commentary to Chapter 1 of the
Talmudic tractate known as Pirkei Avot (Ethics of the Fathers):
" ... the Torah is called "good" because it is completely intellectual
... for a thing which is intellectually separate from matter completely is completely good, and thus the Torah is good in particular; and
the opposite of this is that a thing which is material is completely
bad (ra) .... for badness cleaves to matter.. .. By means of the Torah a
person may become intellectually separate from matter, and then
he is a whole, good creature, and existence is fitting to him .... "12
Passages such as these recur throughout Maharal's works. However, in
other places Maharal seems to express a rather positive attitude toward
the body. Later in the same work,13 Maharal writes that despite the fact
that the human is a partly physical being, he or she is superior to angels
because only the human is created in the divine image or form (tselem).
For Mahara!, this "form" involves some special divine and transcendent
"light" which cleaves only to the human, precisely because the human is
a material being. (Later in this paper I shall discuss Maharal's notion of
the tselem in more detail.) In the course of his discussion Maharal explicitly takes up the question that his position here seems inconsistent with
his earlier claim (quoted above) that the body is inferior to that which is
not material. That is, if the body is inferior to the non-bodily, how can
the human being be superior to an angel? His answer: the body itself is
inferior; the tselem or transcendent "light" which makes the human
superior to the angels is not physical. However, the fact remains that the
form or image requires a body as a substrate. This seems to indicate a
more postive attitude toward the body. Furthermore, in several places,
Maharal defends at length the claim that performance of bodily commandments is necessary for acheiving a "bonding" (devekut) with God. 14
In yet another passage, Maharal disagrees with "those who say that
the act of union between man and woman is shameful" and those who
go so far as to say that the "sense of touch is a shame" to the human
being. IS Although he does not mention him by name, the target of this
criticism appears to be Maimonides, who, citing Aristotle on this subject,
says exactly these things. l6 Maharal claims that the sages of the Talmud
did not view intercourse as despicable, except insofar as a person intentionally engages in intercourse for the sake gratifying his own desire,
rather than for the sake of procreation or for the sake of some divine purpose. Maharal writes that, in and of itself, the act of intercourse is not
despicable; on the contrary it is "the foundation upon which everything
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is built."!7 Furthermore, he writes that there is nothing despicable about
the male sexual organ, except insofar as a person lusts after sexual gratification. Presumably he intends the same point about the sense of touch
and the body generally. That is, in and of itself, the body is not despicable; what is despicable is using the body for the sake of gratification.
While Maharal clearly derides gratification, here he appears to assert that
the the body is, in and of itself, a good thing and not a bad thing.
Can these passages be reconciled with the earlier ones? I:Iaggai BenArtsi has discussed this problem. 18 Citing other scholars as well, BenArtsi has noted that passages in Maharal's writings seem to support
three very different views about how man should relate to the body: 1)
One should remove oneself as much as possible from the body
(Asceticism). 2) One should find a balance between the spiritual and the
bodily (Harmony). 3) One should sanctify the body (kiddush ha-I:KJmer).
Ben-Artsi suggests that all three views are genuinely in Maharal; his resolution consists in the proposal that these represent three developmental
stages in the human's spiritual progress. IY That is, one must first learn to
be an ascetic; after one has mastered physical temptation, one may then
strive to achieve a balance, and finally, one may then strive to achieve
the highest goal, sanctification of the physical.
In effect, Ben-Artsi limits or qualifies the passages that seem to indicate that the body is bad, by saying that this applies only at an early
stage of spiritual development. Indeed, it appears that any attempted
resolution will have to qualify Maharal's statements about the badness
of the body. Nevertheless, I beg to differ from Ben-Artsi's suggestion; it
seems to me that for Maharal, even at the highest stage of spiritual
development, in some respects a certain kind of asceticism, or denial of
the body, remains applicable. But perhaps the negative passages about
the body may be qualified in a different way. A distinct possibility is
that, like many other philosophers and theologians before him, Maharal
uses two different senses of the term bad (ra); the body might be inherently bad in one sense and not inherently bad in another sense. 20 Let us
take note that Maharal accepts the notion there is some sort of equation
between Goodness and Being; entities that have greater being are better
than entities with lesser being. 21 Of the three parts of man, the body is
the most removed or distant from God, who is the absolutely simple
being. 22 Matter is finite, composite; God is not. This means that, in one
sense, matter or the body is inherently "bad". On the other hand, the
intentional turning away from God toward that which is limited, is "bad"
in another sense; a sense which we might more readily designate by the
term "sinful". Clearly, Maharal intends such a distinction, for he claims
that aside from the fact that the body is limited and therefore in some
sense ''bad'', there is a destructive, metaphysical force, namely Satan,
which seeks to drive the human being away from God and toward death
and nothingess. 23 Now the body is not, in this sense, inherently "evil",
for in and of itself the body does not turn away from God. On the contrary, the body is in this sense good, for it is the necessary substrate of
the human image or form, which (as we shall see later) is the highest
and most noble point of contact between God and all creation. Thus,
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when Maharal indicates that the body is bad, he means that it is limited
and finite; when he indicates that the body is not bad, he means that
despite its finitude, it plays a significant role in a positive relationship
between the human being and God. (Admittedly, the weakness in this
solution is that nowhere, to my knowledge, does Maharal explicitly disambiguate two senses of the term "bad".)
II.

Next, let us turn briefly to the soul Cnefesh). Relative to his discussion
of the human body and intellect, Maharal spends little time on the soul,
so I shall have relatively little to say about it here. Maharal believes that
that the soul is a distinct element in the human being. Certain divine
commandments pertain specifically to the SOUP4 Drawing generously
from the philosophical traditon, Maharal says that the soul is the source
of motion in the body, and that it is the seat of the emotions. 25 Maharal
also writes that the soul is a power or force in the body.26 This would
seem to imply that, for Maharal, the soul does not remain in existence
after death in the world to come, since that world is completely separate
from materiality.27 So much for a brief discussion of the soul.
III.

Let us turn now to the intellect (sekhel). Basically, the intellect is the
power to rationally comprehend ideas and doctrines, especially the
Torah, which is an expression of God's intellect. 28 Certain commandments pertain especially to the intellect; and it is part of human completion (hashlamah) to exercise the intellect; study of the Torah is the main
commandment which pertains to and perfects the intellect. 29 At least to
some extent, the intellect is capable of comprehending necessity, infinity,
and in some way, God himself. Relative to the soul and body, the intellect is the least subject to time, space, and contingency. Therefore, the
intellect has a greater kinship with God than does the soul or body. It
follows that the intellect is superior to soul or body. Maharal claims to
find ample support for this claim in Talmudic passages which stress the
significance of the study of Torah?O Needless to say, it is also the case
that the doctrine of the superiority of the intellect has philosophical
roots in Plato and Aristotle.
Clearly, one of the implications of the view that the intellect is superior to body and soul is that, for Maharal, the intellect plays an important
role in one's relationship with God. Despite this, some scholars have
portrayed Maharal as something of an anti-rationalist. Writing about
what he refers to as the sixteenth century "conflict" between Jewish
mysticism and Jewish philosophy, Andre Neher sets up an opposition
between "reason" on the one hand and "mysticism" on the other.31 He
then suggests that Maharal "sought to widen the gap between the two,
so that triumphant mysticism might the more easily throw philosophy
onto the rubbish heap."32 More recently, Byron Sherwin has written,
"For Loew, Jewish philosophy and rationalism are useless distortions of
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Judaism, unworthy of legitimacy or even toleration."33 I shall try to show
here that Neher and Sherwin have misconstrued Maharal's intentions.
This task is important for this paper because it helps clarify Maharal's
subtle perspective on the intellect and its proper role in one's relationship with God.
Neher bases his claim that Maharal sought to reject reason in favor of
mysticism on passages in which Maharal argues against the view that
God's essence is identical with his intellect, and in favor of the view that
the intellect is only one of God's many attributes. 34 Maharal cites the
Zohar and the Kabbalist R. Meir Ibn Gabbai in the course of supporting
his view, and vehemently disputes those who would claim that the
Kabbalists and the philosophers are saying the same things but in two
different languages. 's Indeed Maharal insists that the things being said
by the Kabbalah and the philosophers are diametrically opposed.
Clearly, Maharal here disputes the view of the "philosophers", and
defends the view of the Kabbalah that God's intellect is not identical
with His essence. Perhaps this does represent a profound religious difference. However, it is a serious mistake to construe Maharal's argument
as a broadside against "reason" and in favor of "mysticism". We must
bear in mind that the term "Kabbalah" does not properly translate as
"mysticism", which sometimes carries the insinuation of anti-rationalism. "Kabbalah" translates as "that which is received" or "tradition";
and it is entirely possible that "that which is received" may be rationally
defensible. Indeed, Maharal defends the Kabbalistic view of the divine
attributes on rational grounds; he argues that this view makes more sense,
primarily because it is more consistent with the doctrine of the unity or
simplicity of God. In other words, when Maharal says that "philosophy"
and Kabbalah are diametrically opposed, he means that they are
opposed on the issue at hand, namely the question of whether God's intellect is identical with God's attributes. When Maharal disputes the
"philosophers", he does not intend to impugn rational inquiry or "reason" per se; rather, he means to dispute the views of a certain group of
thinkers known as "philosophers". (Just as medieval writers often used
the term "the philosopher" to refer specifically to Aristotle, so too the
term "philosophers" here refers to a specific group of thinkers, typified
by Maimonides.) No implication is intended that only "philosophers"
attempt to support their views on rational grounds. 36
We may further appreciate Maharal's perspective on the human intellect by considering his approach toward the question of whether God's
existence can be rationally demonstrated. Sherwin claims that Maharal
"assumes God as the only certain existent and never conceives of
demonstrating His existence" .37 He also claims that Maharal "viewed
attempts by Jewish philosophers to demonstrate the existence of God as
a needless endeavor and as a potential threat to already affirmed religious beliefs."38 As evidence for his claim, Sherwin cites Maharal's critique of one of Maimonides' proofs which (on Maharal's reading)
requires the assumption that the heavenly spheres are eternally in
motion. 39 Maharal crticizes this proof on the grounds that the assumption contradicts other traditional Jewish beliefs. Sherwin infers that
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Maharal found the quest for proofs of God's existence threatening to
Judaism. However, Sherwin's argument is flawed; from the fact that
Maharal criticizes a proof for God's existence, it does not follow that he
is uninterested in finding a good proof. Moreover, after criticizing
Maimonides' proof, Maharal proceeds not only to give a different proof
for God's existence, but also to attribute that proof to the sages of the
Talmud, and to claim that this proof is far superior to anything the
"philosophers" have suggested!40 Like Neher, Sherwin has misconstrued
a critique of a view held by some "philosophers" as an indictment of
rationality per se.
What was Maharal's approach toward the reasonability of accepting
the doctrine of the divine revelation of the Torah? In discussing those
who reject divine revelation, Maharal writes:
"There are men of analytic bent who folow their reason. They are
called philosophers. They wish to enlighten themselves concerning
the order and reality of things until they find truth. But they are foolish and walk in darkness. If they really had an interest in wisdom
they would acknowledge revelation as their principle and would no
longer grope in darkness."41
Sherwin construes this as a sort of fidiestic argument that only revelation as opposed to reason can be the basis of belief. However, this is
quite mistaken. In the context, this passage is an introduction by
Maharal of an elaborate attempt to give rational proofs for the claim that
there must be divinely revealed commandments, mainly on telological
grounds that without divine revelation, the human being cannot reach
true completion or perfection. Maharal aims to criticize the "philosophers" on their own grounds; thus he writes "if they really had an interest in wisdom", which is to say, "if they really thought things through
well enough," they would come to the conclusion that - given certain
assumptions which (he believes) both he and they accept - revelation
must occur. This is not an argument for revelation and against reason; it
is an introduction to an argument that there there are reasonable
grounds to believe in revelation. (A full account of that argument is
beyond the scope of this paper.)
Perhaps a stronger case for the claim that Maharal is an anti-rationalist might have been made on the basis of his discussion of the reasons
for commandments. In one place, Maharal writes that we cannot expect
to understand the reasons for all the commandments, because they go
beyond the human intellect."2 However, even here he ultimately suggests
that there is a divine intelligence which dictates the commandmentsY
We are left with the view that even if some of the commandments don't
make sense to us, they do make sense to God; otherwise God would not
command them. So, according to Maharal, human reason unaided by
revelation would never conceive of many of the commandments. There
is a sense, then, in which Maharal believes that without revelation,
human reason is too weak to know everything that is true and good. But
by the same token, Maharal also believes that some of the main princi-
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pIes of the Torah can be rationally defended or substantiated, including
the principle of revelation itself.
A brief contrast between Maharal and R. Meir Ibn Gabbai is instructive here. As we have already seen, Maharal acknowledges R. Meir as
one of his sources. Now the latter argued quite vehemently against the
use of unaided human intelligence in the quest to understand God:14 R.
Meir claimed that only Kabbalah, tradition, can guide one to the truth.
He went so far as to reject the study of "philosophy" altogether. 45 To my
knowledge, we do not find the same sort of argument in Maharal's
works. Thus, it is accurate to say that Maharal is more of a rationalist
than R. Meir.
Having said this, it is nonetheless also accurate to say that Maharal is
lcss of a rationalist than Maimonides. For one thing, Maharal is less
interested than Maimonides in giving proofs for God's existence. And
again, Maharal does not think that God's essence is identical with his
intellect, as Maimonides indicates in several places;'" as we shall see
later, Maharal also does not think that the human essence is identical
with the human intellect. While he attaches great significance to the
intellect and the intellectual pursuit of God, he characterizes the ultimate
end of the human as dcvckut, i.e., "bonding" or "cleaving" to God. This
has an intellectual component, but it goes beyond the intellect as well.
We may say then that Maharal embraces a form of moderate ratonalism.
This notion will be elaborated in the final section of this paper.

IV.
Let us turn, finally, to the human "image" or "form" (tselcm):7 To
repeat, in many places Maharal states that the human has three parts.
But he makes clear in one passage that the tsclcm is a fourth aspect. I
believe the explanation of this has to do with the fact that the tse/cm is
not a "part" of the human being in the same sense as are the body, soul
and intellect. Rather the tsclcm is the form (tsurah) of the human being,
the most basic aspect of human identity.48 Thus, when Maharal intends
to speak of the "parts" of the human being, he will often neglect to mention the tse/cm, precisely because it is not a "part" in the same sense as
the others. Tn any case, the tse/cm is emphatically not the intellect. 49
Maharal sharply disagrees with Maimonides on this point. In the same
vein, as we saw earlier, Maharal disagrees with Maimonides' claim in
the Guidc that God's essence is identical with His Intellect. For Maharal,
God's intellect is one among many of the manifestations or ways in
which God reveals himself to the world. It is no accident that Maharal's
disagreement with Maimonides concerns both human and divine
nature. Again, it may legitimately be said that Maharal is less of a rationalist than Maimonides. However, it does not follow that Maharal denigrates the intellect, nor that he supposes that the human intellect is weak
or ineffectual. Of course, he believes the human intellect is limited and
finite, but so does Maimonides.
Aside from speaking of the tsclcm as the tsurah or "form" of the
human being, Maharal also speaks of the tsclcm as a "transcendent light"
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(or nivdaO which, of all creation including angels and animals, only the
human being possesses.50 It is of course not a physical light; Maharal
makes clear that the term "light" is a way of talking about a spiritual, or
non-material aspect of human identity. In virtue of the tselem, the human
is capable of a unique relationship with God. Maharal further claims
that this tselem is possessable to a greater or lesser degree; that is, it can
be virtually lost and then regained depending on one's behavior. In particular, the Patriarchs and, in general, the descendants of Israel maintain
the tselem; whereas the gentiles, in general, possess it to a lesser degree. 51
Maharal relates this notion to several Talmudic parables or midrashim. 52
It is said that the souls of the righteous are directly underneath the divine
"throne of glory". It is also said that the form of Jacob the Partiarch's
face cleaves to the throne. Interpreting these parables, Maharal says that
the nearness and kinship to the "throne of glory" signifies a nearness
and kinship to the divine being, and a particular suitability to receive
revelation and to achieve devekut or cleaving to God. The tselem constitutes the human being's most fundamental connection with God; the full
realization of that connection is devekut. The tselem is the holiest and
most noble aspect of the human being, and it signifies the potential for a
place in the the world to come. It is because of the tselem that the human
being is the focal point of all creation, and in virtue of the tselem, the
human being is at least capable of reaching a more elevated status than
the angels. Again, this is a point of difference between Maharal and
Maimonides, for latter seems to think that the angels of glory are superior to humans, and utterly rejects the notion that man is the focal point of
creation. 53
According to Maharal, it is in virtue of possessing the tselem that the
human being has free choice. 54 Thus the human being is similar to God
in a unique way; just as God is the King over all, the human is the king
(by God's wish) over the globe. Angels do not possess free choice; this is
another point of difference with Maimonides and agreement with R.
Meir.'5 However, I think it would be a mistake to say that, for Maharal,
the tselem just is the capacity for free choice.'" Rather, it seems that the
tselem remains fundamentally irreducible and indefinable. Although he
does not explicitly say so, Maharal's conception of the tselem and its relation to the three parts of the human being parallels the Kabbalistic conception of the infinite divine essence (the eyn sot> and its relation to the
divine attributes (sefirat).57 This conception is described, for example, in
the work of R. Meir Ibn Gabbai, based on the Bahir and the Zahar.58 That
is, we have the following analogy: The human tselem stands to the body,
soul, and intellect, as the infinite, ineffable divine essence stands to the
divine attributes. So, just as God is not essentially an intellectual being,
nor a merciful being, nor a just being, nor, for that matter, a being who
rules with free choice, so too the human is not essentially an intellectual
being, nor an emotional being, nor a physical being, nor, for that matter,
a being who acts with free choice. The tselem of the human, like the
essence of God, is fundamentally indefinable.
In a somewhat paradoxical fashion, Maharal claims that although the
tselem itself is not a physical entity, it can subsist only in something that

MAHARAL ON THE HUMAN BEING

453

is material. That is, the tselem requires a body. Again, this is similar to
the Kabbalistic notion that in order to be made manifest, the Infinite
divine essence requires a medium, namely, the ten divine attributes
(sefirot). Moreover, Maharal says that certain particular aspects of the
human body are expressive of the tselem. These include, the human face
and the erect posture of the human being.59 Maharal claims that these
aspects of the human body notably represent, in the first case, the spiritual "light" or special relationship between God and the human, and, in
the second case, the human's capacity for dominion or rulership over the
globe, paralleling God's dominion over the universe. In any case, while
these aspects of the human body represent the tselem, the tselem is not
reducible to them. This fits with the Kabbalistic notion that while the
infinite divine essence is represented by, but not reducible to, the ten
divine attributes, these attributes make up the image of a "Primal Man",
which is in turn symbolically represented by the human physique. 60
Maharal claims that just as the body is necessary as a substrate of the
tselcm, so too the Torah, which is in reality a metaphysical entity,
requires a material substrate, i.e., the physical human being who fulfills
the word of the Torah.
" ... The Torah, which is a transcendent intellect, requires a material
substrate; and just as the image of God which is found in man and not
angels requires a material receptor, so is it necessary for anything
which is completely transcendent to have a receptor that is material."61
We may ask, why is it necessary for the tselem to have a "material receptor"? Maharal's answer lies in passages such as this one:
" ... God is absolutely simple; therefore he chose lowly ones who are
simple and have no high rank ... and therefore this [unique] connection must be only with man who is flesh and blood .... "62
The basic point seems to be that it is because the simplicity of God is
absolute that it can best be made manifest within something that is most
inferior, i.e., finite, physical reality. Similarly, in another passage,
Maharal writes that the fact that God is the ultimate agent and cause of
the universe is best made manifest not by the adoration of God by
angels, but rather by the worship (avodah) of God by physical human
beings, precisely because the physical human being is at the lowest level
of the chain of agency and causation in the universeY A full discussion
of these claims would require an analysis of Maharal's metaphysics,
which I will not undertake here. For the present purpose, it must suffice
to say that while Maharal identifies the tselem as the most elevated and
transcendent aspect of the human being, he also claims that the tselem
requires a physical, finite body in order to subsist. 64
In summation of this paper, Maharal's view of the human being is a
blend of ideas drawn from the Scriptural, Talmudic, philosophical, and
Kabbalistic traditions. According to Maharal, rationality, emotion, and
physicality are all significant parts of the human being; each of these
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parts has an important role to play in human and Jewish life. Yet,
beyond these three parts, there is the tselem, which is the most fundamental, yet indefinable, aspect of human identity. While intellect, soul,
and body must all playa role in one's relationship with God, it is ultimately by virtue of the ineffable tselem that the human may develop a
relationship or kinship with the ineffable divine essence of God.

Bellarmine College
NOTES
1. This paper is a revision of an oral presentation at a meeting of the
Academy of Jewish Philosophy in 1994. Thanks are due to members of the
Academy and Eleonore Stump for comments and suggestions. Thanks are
also due to Anne-Marie Karpinsky for helping me understand Andre
Neher's work in French.
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24. Drush le-Shabbat Tshuvah, p. 78.
25. See Ibid.; Gevurot Ha-Shem, p.166; Tiferet Yisrael, p.8.
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 28-29
32. Ibid., p.29.
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the belief in a personal deity. For a recent discussion of this issue, see
Menachem Kellner, Maimonides on Human Perfection (Atlanta: Scholars press,
1990), especially ch. 7.
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